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a b s t r a c t
Although many of the concepts included in cyber security awareness training are univer-
sal, such training often must be tailored to address the policies and requirements of a par-
ticular organization. In addition, many forms of training fail because they are rote and do
not require users to think about and apply security concepts. A flexible, highly interactive
video game, CyberCIEGE, is described as a security awareness tool that can support orga-
nizational security training objectives while engaging typical users in an engaging security
adventure. The game is now being successfully utilized for information assurance educa-
tion and training by a variety of organizations. Preliminary results indicate the game can
also be an effective addition to basic information awareness training programs for general
computer users (e.g., annual awareness training.)
ª 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Typical employees of both large and small organizations may
be made acutely aware of a wide array of cyber security prob-
lems. These range from spam and phishing to well organized
attacks intended to corrupt or disable systems. Despite these
constant reminders, users often take an ostrich-like attitude
toward the security of the information systems they use,
believing that there is little that they can do to mitigate this
onslaught of problems. Even within the major organizations,
users select trivial passwords or think that, so long as they
keep their machines within viewing distance, arbitrary
hookups to unknown networks and to the Internet pose no
threat. Thus, despite their increased awareness of security
problems, users and administrators of systems continue to
take few effective precautions. Yet, to achieve an adequate se-
curity posture, organizations must combat this user apathy
with effective training and awareness programs. The enor-
mity of the problem associated with effective user trainingand awareness is evident in that it was considered one of
five areas of highest priority for action in a national plan for
cyberspace security (EOP, 2003).
Human factor studies illustrating the need for user training
and awareness are well documented, e.g. (Whalen, 2001). The
concept of using games to support health, education,manage-
ment, and other sectors has resulted in a high level of interest
and activity (Prenski, 2001). The tacit knowledge gained by
applying concepts in a virtual environment can significantly
enhance student understanding.
A number of games have been developed involving protec-
tion of assets in cyberspace. Some teach information assur-
ance concepts, e.g. CyberProtect (DoD, 1999), whereas others
provide pure entertainment with no basis in information
assurance principles or reality (Nexus, 2003). None have pre-
sented an engaging virtual world that combines the human
and technical factors associated with an IT environment. In
addition, these games are limited in the scope of information
assurance topics covered. Short of going back to the creator for* Corresponding author.
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game.
Effective user security awareness training can greatly en-
hance the information assurance posture of an organization
(NIST, 1993). Yet holding a trainee’s attention sufficiently
long to impart a message is a considerable challenge, particu-
larly when the training is mandated and the target audience
views the topic as potentially mundane. Video games have
been proposed as an engaging training vehicle (Prenski,
2001). Here we describe a video game-like tool called Cyber-
CIEGE and how it was employed to develop security aware-
ness training targeted for the requirements of a specific
organization, and how this extensible tool can offer training
and education for a range of target audiences. For this analy-
sis, training for uniformed and civilian personnel associated
with the U.S. Navy has been conducted.
CyberCIEGE is unique in that it is a highly extensible game
for teaching informationassuranceconcepts. Itmaybeapplied
to a wide range of audiences having different levels of techni-
cal sophistication. It has its own language for creating new
educational scenarios and is accompanied by tools and tuto-
rials that help instructors develop customized scenarios.
We start with a review of commonly used training and
awareness techniques, and follow with an overview of Cyber-
CIEGE and a more detailed description of how scenarios for
the game are constructed. At this point, it will be possible to
examine policies for information assurance training and
awareness of our target organization and then describe a tar-
geted requirement analysis. How two CyberCIEGE scenarios,
one for general awareness and the other for IT personnel,
were created to fulfill organizational information assurance
training and awareness requirements will follow. This work
concludes by pointing to several new directions for further
development of the CyberCIEGE educational tool.
2. Background
To provide a context for subsequent discussion of CyberCIEGE
as a tool for user training and awareness in information assur-
ance, it is useful to review both current training and aware-
ness methods as well as provide an overview of CyberCIEGE.
2.1. Common current training and awareness
techniques
Training and awareness is generally accomplished using one
or a combination of several techniques described below.
Formal Training Sessions can be instructor-led, brown-bag
seminars, or video sessions. Formal training in sessions facili-
tatedby local informationsecurity personnel represents the tra-
ditional approach to user training and awareness within the
Department of the Navy. The success of this approach depends
upontheabilityof thetrainingfacilitatortoengagetheaudience.
Passive computer-based and web-based training represents
a centralized approach to the training and awareness prob-
lem. An example is the web-based training in information as-
surance offered by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD,
2006). CBT offers the user the flexibility of self-paced training,
and provides the organization with the ability to train users toan enterprise-wide standard. Its disadvantage is that training
and awareness becomes amonotonous slide show that fails to
challenge the user and provides no dialogue for further elabo-
ration. Often, users attempt to complete CBT sessions with
minimal time or thought. The CBT developer must attempt
to provide engaging instruction within the constraints of
a passive medium.
Strategic placement of awareness messages seeks to raise the
level of consciousness through the delivery of messages in
the workplace. Some of the more common delivery methods
include organizational newsletters and memos, email mes-
sages, posters, screen savers, and security labels, e.g. posters
highlighting various cyber security risks (CCS, 2006).
Interactive computer-based training, such as a video game,
generally falls into two broad classes: first-person interaction
games or resource management simulations. The majority of
games falls into the first category and include first-person
shooter gameswhere the player is confronted by an adversary
or problem and must take an appropriate action or is penal-
ized, sometimes severely. In contrast, resource management
games require the player tomanage a virtual environment us-
ing limited resources. The player attempts to make choices
that improve the environment within the constraints of the
available resources. Good choices result in a richer environ-
ment and additional resources. SimCity, other ‘‘sims’’
games, and RollerCoaster Tycoon (R) are popular examples
of resource management games.
Games and simulations have become increasingly
accepted as having enormous potential as powerful teaching
tools that may result in an ‘‘instructional revolution’’ (Fore-
man, 2004). Prenski (2001) and Gee (2005) have provided
a framework to construct and analyze games in education.
The latter has described the context of a specific game as a se-
miotic domain that allows students to learn an area through
use and experience while leading the student to approach
problem solving through critical thinking. Analysis of the
effectiveness of games is in its infancy; however, pioneering
work (Gee, 2003; Aguilera and Mendiz, 2003; Squire, 2005;
Gredler, 2004) isbeginningtoshowthatgamesofferaneffective
alternative to, or supplement for, more traditional modes of
education. For example, through the use of virtual worlds,
games provide a concrete experience within which students
can internalize domain-specific concepts. Student’s critical
thinking skills are honed. In addition, the game format often
appeals to students with short attention spans.
2.2. CyberCIEGE
In 2005, the Naval Postgraduate School released an U.S. Gov-
ernment version of CyberCIEGE, a video game intended to
support education and training in computer and network se-
curity. Simultaneously, our collaborators at Rivermind, Inc.
made a version available to non-government organizations.
The game employs resource management and simulation to
illustrate information assurance concepts for education and
training (Irvine and Thompson, 2003, 2004). In the Cyber-
CIEGE virtual world, players construct and configure the com-
puter networks necessary to allow virtual users to be
productive and achieve goals to further the success of the en-
terprise. Players operate and defend their networks, and can
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attack by hackers, vandals and potentially well-motivated
professionals.
2.2.1. CyberCIEGE components
The building blocks of CyberCIEGE consist of several elements:
a unique simulation engine, a domain-specific scenario defini-
tion language, a scenario development tool, and a video-
enhanced encyclopedia (Irvine et al., March 2005). CyberCIEGE
is intended to be extensible in that new CyberCIEGE scenarios
tailored to specific audiences and topics are easily created
(Irvine et al., June 2005).
The scenario definition language expresses security-
related risk management trade-offs for different scenarios.
The CyberCIEGE simulation engine interprets this scenario
definition language and presents the player with the resulting
simulation. What the player experiences and the conse-
quences of the player choices are a function of the scenario
as expressed using the scenario definition language.
The game engine and the language that feeds it are rich
in information assurance concepts so that it is possible to
simulate sophisticated environments subject to a variety
of threats and vulnerabilities. They also include substantial
support for relatively brief, scripted training and awareness
scenarios. This support includes cartoon-like balloon speech
by the virtual users, message tickers, pop-up quizzes
and conditional play of video sequences, e.g., a computer
worm.
So that educators are able to assess their students, Cyber-
CIEGE also produces a log of player activity. Triggers within
the scenario cause output to be appended to the log where
a number of status indicators may be recorded. A separate
log is maintained for each player, thus allowing the instructor
to track the progress of individual students.
The set of CyberCIEGE components is illustrated in Fig. 1.2.2.2. Development and Testing of CyberCIEGE
The collaborative development of CyberCIEGEwas an iterative
process by video game developers with little knowledge of in-
formation assurance, and information assurance technolo-
gists with little background in video games. Early focus was
on establishing a language that would allow us to construct
scenarios as per our broad teaching objectives (Irvine and
Thompson, 2003). This scenario development language
evolved around a core ability to express a security policy in
terms of users and information (Irvine and Thompson, 2004).
The game developers built the CyberCIEGE game engine using
Cþþ and their 3D graphics library. The enginewas designed to
consume the scenario definition language and behave in a log-
ically consistent manner.
Some scenario language elements were relatively straight-
forward to represent in the game engine. For example, the
costs of purchasing computer equipment, or the penalties in-
curred when users were not able to achieve goals are concep-
tually straightforward, and have analogues in other resource
management games. Innovation was required to automate
assessment of vulnerabilities in networks constructed by
players such that the game could mount credible attacks.
The attack logic within the game engine required several iter-
ations and considerable testing. Dozens of test scenarios were
generated to exercise the engine’s response to a range of
topologies, component configurations and attacker motives.
Ultimately, some of the attack logic within the game engine
was built around the tests rather than to any precise specifica-
tion. Formost scenarios, this has proven adequate. The result-
ing attack engine represents a range of security policies,
including those modeled by Bell and LaPadula (1975) and
Biba (1977), as well as discretionary security policies (Lunt,
1989; Bishop, 2002).
CyberCEIGE has been the basis for several master theses at

















Fig. 1 – CyberCIEGE components.
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able breadth and depth of informal testing. The CyberCIEGE
user interface has undergone more formal testing by the
Pacific Northwest National Laboratories (Roberts et al., 2006).
That testing resulted in several refinements of the game
interface.
The scenario development tool (Johns, 2004) and the re-
lated tools (Teo, 2003) were developed using Java. And again,
student theses work provided substantial informal testing of
these tools.
The game and the tools all are designed to run on the Win-
dows 2000 and Windows XP operating system. The graphic li-
braries make considerable use of the DirectX interface to
render the three dimensional world.
3. Scenario construction
Story telling is the key to a good CyberCIEGE scenario. The
player should readily grasp the nature of the virtual environ-
ment (e.g., a small business with valuable intellectual prop-
erty) and the types of choices that he has to make. Within
this context, the player should have reason to care about the
ramifications of these choices.
Scenario designers utilize the scenario definition language
to construct a virtual environment that drives players tomake
resource management decisions. These player choices affect
the productivity of an enterprise, and affect the vulnerability
of information assets to compromise by virtual attackers.
The CyberCIEGE game engine interprets the scenario defini-
tion language, presenting the player with a virtual environ-
ment as defined by the designer. To construct a scenario, the
designer must understand the semantics of the scenario def-
inition language and the capabilities of the CyberCIEGE
game engine. A form-based integrated development environ-
ment allows designers to construct scenarios without master-
ing the syntax of the design language (Johns, 2004).
3.1. Programming the CyberCIEGE game engine
In every CyberCIEGE scenario, the player is the information
assurance decision maker for some enterprise. An enterprise
may be a large military facility, or it may be a home office.
The fundamental abstractions within the CyberCIEGE game
engine are not computers, networks and protection mecha-
nisms. Rather, they are assets, users, and attackers (Irvine
and Thompson, 2003). Assets are information resources.
Users are typically employees of the enterprise who have
goals that require computerized access to assets. Players
succeed by facilitating user access to assets. Some assets
have substantial value to the enterprise based on secrecy
or integrity. And some assets may have value based on their
availability. Assets also have value to attackers, and this mo-
tive determines the means by which the attacker will
attempt to compromise an asset. Player choices affect the
opportunity (or lack thereof) for the attacker to compromise
the assets. The enterprise (and by extension the player) is
penalized the value of an asset should it be compromised
or made unavailable.Within any given scenario, the users, assets, and attackers
are for the most part fixed by the designer and are not modi-
fied by player choices. Designers also specify the initial state
of the scenario (e.g., an initial set of computers) and dynamic
changes to the scenario (e.g., the introduction of new user
goals.)
Players see the enterprise as an animated three dimen-
sional representation of an office building or military head-
quarters. Each scenario has one main office and an optional
small offsite office. Users inhabit these buildings, wandering
about or productively sitting at desks in front of computers.
If computers are available, either as a scenario default or
through purchase by the player, users will create and access
assets using the computers. This user behavior is driven by
the user goals specified by the designer. If computers are net-
worked together, users may access assets over the network.
Network devices such as routers enable users to access the
Internet, and allow attackers on the Internet to potentially
access enterprise resources. Suitably motivated attackers can
enter buildings to compromise assets. They may compromise
computer-based protection mechanisms, and may wiretap
network links. Attackers may also bribe untrustworthy users
to compromise assets. Finally, users themselves may have
motive to compromise assets.
Players may hire guards to help with the physical protec-
tion of buildings or offices within buildings. Players may pur-
chase physical protection mechanisms such as alarms and
they may select which users are permitted to access different
physical areas (i.e., ‘‘zones’’) within the virtual buildings. Pro-
cedural security choices affect user behavior (e.g., leaving
computers logged in). Players can purchase user training to
improve user adherence to procedural policies.
3.2. The game engine as illustrated with
a simple scenario
Consider a scenario consisting of a single asset and a single
user having a goal to read the asset. If this scenario is fed to
the CyberCIEGE engine, the user will fail to achieve the goal
of reading the asset until the player buys the user a computer.
The designer associates a productivity valuewith the user that
affects the size of the penalty resulting from failure to access
the asset. When the player purchases a computer, the user
will create the asset on the computer. Once it exists on a com-
puter, attackers potentially target the asset. For example, an
attacker might break into the office housing the computer
and walk off with the entire computer. Or, if the asset’s at-
tacker motive is based on integrity, the attacker might hack
into the computer andmodify the data. If the asset is compro-
mised, the player is penalized as specified when the designer
defines the asset.
In the above example, the designer simply defines a user
and an asset. The game engine manages the rest (Irvine and
Thompson, 2004). The game enginemanages the virtual econ-
omy to reward players when users are productive and to pe-
nalize them when goals are not achieved or assets are
compromised. It also includes a sophisticated attack engine
to assess the suitability of the current protectionmechanisms
to protect the assets based on the asset motive.
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In addition to defining assets and users, the designer specifies
the initial state of the scenario including:
 Physical security properties (e.g., alarms, guards, etc.) of the
different zones (e.g., offices);
 The set of pre-existing computers and their configurations
including network connections;
 Procedural security policies to be followed by the users;
 Initial user training (This affects adherence to procedural
policies.);
 Background checks for different kinds of users (e.g., based
on user clearance);
 Which kinds of attacks will be initially active and which will
be suppressed;
 How much money the player will start with;
 The kinds of computers and network devices available for
purchase; and
 Support staff available to help, administer and maintain
computer systems.
3.4. Interacting with the player and dynamically
altering the scenario
The CyberCIEGE scenario definition language allows scenario
designers to periodically assess the ongoing game state ‘‘con-
ditions’’ and respond using active ‘‘triggers’’. Game state con-
ditions include such things as the passing of time, whether
users are achieving their goals, computer configuration
settings and whether attackers have compromised assets.
Active triggers include pop-up messages, brief movies,
changes in user goals, commencement of attacks, and user
feedback to the player via balloon speech as reflected in
Fig. 2.
Scenarios are divided into multiple phases, each of which
includes one or more objectives that the player must achieveprior tomoving on to the next phase. Designers use conditions
and triggers to assess whether objectives have been met and
to change the environment for the next phase (e.g., introduce
additional user goals).
3.5. Scenario audience selection
The first step in the design of a scenario is to identify its pur-
pose and audience. For example, does the intended audience
have experience with computer games? Are they expected to
have played other CyberCIEGE scenarios and thus have
some level of mastery of the mechanics of the game?
The scenario definition language supports a broad range of
different types of scenarios. At one end of the spectrum are
simple scripted scenarios such as those intended for basic
training and awareness. These scenarios are designed to af-
fect user behavior where human factors are the sources for
potential security compromises (Whalen, 2001), e.g., ‘‘beware
of email attachments.’’ This type of scenario is often built en-
tirely from conditions and triggers, with very little reliance on
the game engines’ economy or attack engines. For example,
a set of conditions assess whether the user has been
instructed to beware of email attachments, and triggers pro-
vide direct feedback based on that game state. At the other
end are sophisticated scenarios for players who have a basic
understanding of network security engineering. These scenar-
ios rely more on the game engine itself to direct attacks and
manage the overall economy.
3.6. Elements of scenario design
The scenario designer defines the information assets. What
kind of information is it? What is the asset value and what
makes it valuable? Why would an attacker target the asset?
The designer also defines the users. What assets do the users
need to access? Why do they need to access them? Do users
need to share assets? Do users require access to assets via
the Internet (e.g., publicly available documents)?Fig. 2 – Pop-up messages can be initiated using active triggers.
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nario briefing and in the descriptions of the assets and users.
This textual information is intended to provide players with
the context of the scenario. The designer describes individual
player objectives and specifies the conditions that constitute
the achievement of each objective. The initial state of the sce-
nario can be used to constrain a player’s options. For example,
a player can be given insufficient cash to fully secure a site un-
til an initial set of objectives is achieved.
Finally, the designer specifies feedback to move the player
along through the scenario based on current game conditions.
For example, what should a user say or think if a specific goal
cannot be met? The engine causes the user to wander aim-
lessly or violently pound on the keyboard. The designer can
enhance this with specific user ‘‘thoughts’’ or comments
that appear in bubble text. In some scenarios the designer
may choose to assess the suitability of protectionmechanisms
using conditions and warn the player prior to the attack
engine’s exploitation of the vulnerability. And in other scenar-
ios the designer will provide substantial help tips to aid the
player with the mechanics of the tool. CyberCIEGE includes
a rich on-line encyclopedia that can serve as context-
dependent help. Ultimately the designer selects the conditions
that constitute a ‘‘win’’ or a ‘‘loss’’, and provides the text to
display in the respective debriefing. The encyclopedia includes
several animated movie tutorials (e.g., describing malicious
software) that can be launched as a part of the debriefing.
3.7. Integrated development environment
Designers build andmodify scenarios using the Scenario Devel-
opment Tool (SDT), which automates the syntax of the Cyber-
CIEGE scenario definition language through the use of
reusable libraries and forms having pull down menus (Johns,
2004). As is illustrated in Fig. 3, the SDT permits the designer
to compile and run scenarios, and then view a formattedpresentation of the resulting log (Teo, 2003). In Figs. 3 and 4
the numbered arrows indicate the sequence of interactions.
The SDT performs input validation and limited consistency
checking (e.g., ensuring that references to users are valid).
The SDTUsers Guide (CISR, 2002) includes a tutorial thatwalks
new designers through the construction of a complete sce-
nario. The SDT was used to construct the scenarios described
below. The source for these and other scenarios is distributed
with CyberCIEGE, and developers may use the SDT to alter or
expand the scenarios. Upon completing development or revi-
sionofascenario,designersuse theCampaignManager togroup
the scenario with other scenarios into a collection of scenarios
that are to be played by students in sequence as illustrated in
Fig. 4. Instructors can view summaries and details of student
progress via the Campaign Analyzer as illustrated in Fig. 5.
At this point, it is possible to examine how CyberCIEGE can
be applied to the training and awareness needs of a real orga-
nization, in our example, the U.S. Navy.
4. Requirements elicitation
Two factors determine the requirements for the use of Cyber-
CIEGE as a training and awareness tool in the context of the
U.S. Navy. The first is the collection of policies that mandate
training and awareness activities within the Military and the
Navy. This is followed by an analysis of specific topics that
must be addressed.
4.1. Current policies for IA training and awareness
Like the other services, the U.S. Navymust adhere to laws and
directives intended to cover the entire Department of Defense
(DoD). This section will describe the important laws and poli-
cies that have affected Navy choices with respect to training
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Fig. 3 – Scenario designers use the SDT and the Campaign Manager.












Fig. 4 – Students use the Campaign Player.The United States Computer Security Act of 1987 man-
dated periodic security training for all users of Federal infor-
mation systems. In response, the Department of the Navy
placed the burden of responsibility for training and aware-
ness on local Information Systems Security Managers
(NSOP, 1995), who were, in turn, responsible for developing
local training sessions or CBT. To supplement other IA direc-
tives (DoD, 2002, 2006), in 2004, theU.S. Department of Defense
issued DoD Directive 8570.1 (DoD, 2004), which mandated
initial and annual refresher information assurance training
for all DoD information system users. Since then, all users of
Navy information systems have been instructed to complete
a DoD IA awareness CBT. The CBT is a web-enabled slide
presentation. It is trivial for a personnel to click through the
training to its successful completion without absorbing any
of the material.
Directive 8750.1 has highlighted the importance of foster-
ing a security culture and the need to find training techniques
that will actively engage the typical user. A participatory video
game requires more user involvement than slide presenta-
tions or other standard training and awareness vehicles.
4.2. Requirements analysis
Training and awareness requirements were developed from
the legacy Information Security program of the U.S. Navy
and from the current Department of Defense IA training and
awareness computer-based training course.
Many of the requirements for the awareness scenario were
obtained from the U.S. Navy Information Security Program.
Navy requirements for user security training are found in the
Navy INFOSECprogramguidebooksfor local InformationSystem
Security Officers (NSOP, February 1996) and Network Security
Officers (NSOP,March 1996). These documents offer recommen-
ded training curriculum topics and subtopics including: The value of information, e.g., personnel files, legal records,
and trade secrets
 Communication and computer vulnerabilities such as mali-
cious software, Internet risks, human errors, and Internet
security risks
 Basic safe computing practices such as locking computers
when unattended
 Password management including password generation,
protection, and change frequency
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Fig. 5 – Instructors use the Campaign Analyzer.
c om p u t e r s & s e c u r i t y 2 6 ( 2 0 0 7 ) 6 3 – 7 270The other requirements source was the DoD Information
Assurance Awareness CBT. The majority of naval organiza-
tions currently use the ‘‘DoD Information Assurance
Awareness’’ CBT (DoD, 2006) to fulfill obligations for
enterprise-wide annual refresher training. It addresses the
following topic areas:
 Importance of IA (overview, evolution, and policy)
 IA threats (threats, vulnerabilities, social engineering, and
internet security)
 Malicious code (overview, protection, and internet hoaxes)
 User roles (system security and protecting DoD information)
 Personal and home security (on-line transactions and secu-
rity tips)
These topics provided the requirements for the video
game-based training and awareness.
5. Scenarios for training and awareness
Two CyberCIEGE scenarios were designed to fulfill the Navy IA
training requirements. The first seeks to make the player
aware of basic IA problems and principles. The second is
intended for more sophisticated users of computer-based as-
sets. A brief summary of other CyberCIEGE awareness and
training scenarios is provided in Section 5.2.
The basic user scenario focuses on computer security fun-
damentals. The player is placed in the role of a security deci-
sion maker aboard a ship, who must complete objectives that
raise the security posture of the organization. If objectives are
not completed within a specified time, appropriate attacks are
triggered by the game engine and the player is penalized. After
completing each objective, the player is presented with an
awareness message that relates the action taken in the
game with real-life circumstances and provides feedback re-
garding the players choices. The player wins by completing
all the objectives without incurring ‘‘fatal’’ penalties.
For each topic identified in the requirements analysis,
a scenario element was created that requires the player to
do something that will convey the concept to be learned.
Some of the topics and activities are described in Table 1.
Features that made this scenario Navy-specific included the
protection of classified information and cultural aspects of
organizational security associated with the hierarchical com-
mand structure of the DoD.
5.1. Scenarios for IT staff
Navy IT training requirements for staff with IT-related jobs
are addressed by a second scenario that focuses on network
security, and serves to introduce technical users into the roles
theymust assume. The player assumes the role of acting secu-
rity manager while the ‘‘boss’’ is away. The player must man-
age three internal networks, one of which processes classified
information. During this scenario, the player must complete
technical objectives addressing physical security mecha-
nisms, access control, filtering, antivirus protection, data
backups, patching configurations, password policies, and net-
work vulnerability assessment.5.2. Other scenarios
The rich and flexible CyberCIEGE scenario definition language
supports informationassurance trainingbeyondmilitary envi-
ronments. For example, an ‘‘identity theft’’ scenario was built
to teach users about the methods of identity theft prevention
in home computing environments (Ruppar, 2005). This
scenario focuses on a few basic user behaviors that can greatly
reduce the risk of identity theft, while highlighting
consequencesof riskybehavior throughanengagingstory line.
One set of scenarios was developed solely to help train
users to reduce the risks of distributing worms and viruses.
Here, the player can see the damaging effects ofworms and vi-
ruses, and learns that a major cause of malicious software
proliferation is through user execution of email attachments.
Other CyberCIEGE scenarios illustrate more complex and
subtle information assurance concepts. These longer, more
sophisticated scenarios are more like traditional simulation
and resource management games. For these, the target audi-
ence may be advanced computer security students, or infor-
mation security decision makers.
Several students have developed relatively complex sce-
narios as part of their master’s thesis work, an example of
which is described by Fielk (2004). And while not all such
efforts have resulted in polished games that are fun to
play, the process of building scenarios requires students
Table 1 – Basic awareness topics and player activities
Topic Player activity
Introductory IA briefing This briefing includes definitions
and descriptions of important
IA elements and how they interact.
Information value The user must protect high value




The player is introduced to both
mandatory and discretionary access
control, with the latter as a supplement
to controls on classified information.
Social engineering The player is presented with a scenario
that will lead to a social engineering
attack if proper action is not taken.
Password management The player must prevent a game
character from revealing his
password to an outside contractor.
Malicious software and
basic safe computing
The player must determine and
expend resources to procure three
procedural settings that will prevent
malicious software propagation.
Safeguarding data The player is presented with a
situation where it appears that a
game character is leaving the
premises with sensitive information.
Actions taken by the player allow
the importance of secure storage of
backups to be conveyed.
Physical security
mechanisms
The player must select cost-effective
physical security mechanisms to
prevent unauthorized entry
into sensitive areas.
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order to build a consistent virtual environment. For exam-
ple building a scenario requires the student to explain an
asset’s value to the player in a way that the player can
understand both the consequences of asset compromise,
and the motives of would-be attackers.
The two Navy IA training scenarios described above were
completed as part of amaster’s thesis. Development of a basic
scenario, including a substantial learning curve for the SDT,
requires between 330 and 400 h of work depending on the stu-
dent’s aptitude and programming skills.
6. Discussion and future work
This paper demonstrates that information assurance aware-
ness and training can be provided in an engaging format.
CyberCIEGE was employed to meet a specific set of Navy IA
training requirements, thus demonstrating that it is suffi-
ciently flexible to illustrate a range of security topics in a vari-
ety of environments, both generic and organization-specific.
Initial test results for the basic user training scenario are pos-
itive and illustrate the utility of CyberCIEGE in supporting
awareness programs.
6.1. User experiences
CyberCIEGE was originally developed to be made available at
no cost to organizations of the federal government of the
United States. Since then, our development partner elected
to alsomake it available at no cost to schools and universities.
To date, approximately 130 organizations have made inquires
at the CyberCIEGE website (CISR, 2006) and have been given
download instructions. A number of these organizations cur-
rently use the game as a training tool.
The tool is used at our institution within our information
assurance curriculum, and has been the subject of several
master theses as described in Section 2.2.2.
These and more casual user experiences have resulted in
feedback on CyberCIEGE, which has led to a number of recent
improvements.
6.2. Future work
The effectiveness of CyberCIEGE for basic information as-
surance awareness has not yet been fully assessed. While
initial feedback has been positive, a side-by-side compari-
son with traditional on-line click-through awareness pro-
grams (DoD, 2006) is needed. This testing would include
a test group that only recieves CyberCIEGE training, one
group that only receives click-through training and one
group that receives both. Our informal experiences show
that some users simply will not expend any effort to learn
even the most basic mechanics of a video game. For these
users, interactive training methods will not be effective if
they require anything more involved that the repeated
clicking of a mouse or pressing of an enter key. On the
other hand, those users with some experience in video
games or adventure games appear more inclined to explorethe game, sometimes proceeding beyond the simple aware-
ness scenarios into more sophisticated scenarios. A test
study with a relatively large user pool would help quantify
the usefulness of CyberCEIGE in place of or in addition to
existing on-line awareness programs.
There are several functional aspects of CyberCIEGE for
which future work is planned. First, it would be useful for
instructors to be able to monitor the ongoing progress of
students as they advance through either a single scenario or
a campaign of several scenarios. Additional mechanisms
and tools will be required in the CyberCIEGE framework to
support this capability.
The ability of the scenario designer to use triggers and
other dynamic mechanisms to cause changes in the evolu-
tion of a scenario is one of the greatest strengths of Cyber-
CIEGE. Further investigation is required to determine
additional techniques to introduce dynamic content in the
game. In addition, the tool would benefit from better develop-
ment interfaces with which to experiment with and test dy-
namic content.
Many video games involvemultiple users and such activity
is envisioned for CyberCIEGE. We have conducted a require-
ments analysis for a multiplayer version of CyberCIEGE and
have determined how best to engagemultiple players without
turning it into an exercise that would give the appearance of
promoting misbehavior on IT systems. Players are assumed
to be concerned about partners with whom they might con-
duct cyber-based business interactions. To determine
whether other systems are qualified to be a participant in
the protection of his information assets, a player would
conduct various tests on these foreign systems. The game
would consist of a scenario-specific number of rounds of prep-
aration and testing by all nodes. As with existing single-player
scenarios, tests could be focused on a particular information
assurance issue, such as passwords or firewall configuration,
or could cover a broad range of topics.
CyberCIEGE is currently designed to address wired net-
works. A more advanced version of the game could include
both wired and wireless platforms. For the latter, issues asso-
ciated with user and platform mobility, platform resources,
wireless authentication, etc. could be addressed. In addition,
CyberCIEGE could anticipate the security challenges that will
be encountered in the next generation of processors. These in-
clude the management of virtual machine monitors and their
guest operating systems in virtual machines, platform moni-
toring and attestation, distributed system management, and
the balance between corporate convenience and individual
privacy.
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